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Abstract
It has been argued that rare economic disasters can explain most asset pricing puzzles.
If this is the case, perceived risk associated with a disaster in stock markets should
be revealed in household portfolios. That is, the framework that solves these pricing
puzzles should also generate quantities that are consistent with the observed ones.
This paper estimates the perceived risk of disasters (both probability and expected
size) that is consistent with observed portfolios and consumption growth between
1983 and 2004 in the United States. I nd that the portfolio choice of households
that have less than a college degree can be partially explained by expectations of
stock markets disasters only if one allows for a large probability of labor income
loss at the same time. Such disaster expectations however, are not revealed in the
portfolios of educated and wealthier households; simple per-period participation costs
to stock market coupled with preference heterogeneity explain their participation and
investment patterns.
1 Introduction
Following Mehra and Prescott s seminal 1985 article, a large body of research has ac-
cumulated which proposes solutions to the "equity premium puzzle." Various strands
of the literature consider preference re-specications (Campbell and Cochrane (1999),
Bansal and Yaron (2004)), market frictions and preference heterogeneity (Constan-
tinides et al. (2002)), and model uncertainty (Weitzman (2008)). An alternative
strand of the literature emphasizes the limitations of the post-war historical return
data. The observed equity premium can be rationalized if the standard model takes
into account the possibility of rare but disastrous market events (such as occurred
before the post-war period).
This idea was rst proposed by Reitz (1988) and extended by Barro (2006) and
Barro and Ursua (2008). Barro (2006) analyses 20th century disasters using GDP
and stock market data from 35 countries. He suggests that a disaster probability of
1:5 2 percent a year, with an associated decline in per capita GDP of 15 64 percent
from peak to trough, goes a long way in explaining the equity premium puzzle. In
follow up work using aggregate consumption data from 21 countries, Barro and Ursua
( 2008) calibrate the disaster probability to 3:6 percent a year with an associated 22
percent decline in consumption from peak to trough. More recently, Gabaix (2008)
proposes a framework in which disasters have varying intensity. This framework can
explain, in addition to the equity premium puzzle, many other asset pricing puzzles
such as excess volatility, the value premium and the upward sloping nominal yield
curve.
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The equity premium puzzle has a spectacular manifestation in household micro
data: most recent empirical evidence suggests that at least fty percent of households
in any developed country do not hold equities directly or indirectly (the stock market
participation puzzle). Moreover, in contrast to the predictions of the standard model,
we observe a great deal of heterogeneity in the share of risky assets (stocks) in house-
hold portfolios even after conditioning on stock market participation and controlling
for income and wealth (see Bertaut 1998 and Guiso et al (2002)). Given the rather
impressive equity premium in the post-war period, a particular di¢ culty in reconcil-
ing the standard model with observed facts is in explaining why younger households
often hold both risk-free and risky assets. In its standard form, life cycle portfolio
theory with labor income risk and return uncertainty predicts that households who
are early in their life cycle should take advantage of the high equity premium and
hold large positions in stocks. In fact, the model often predicts a 100 percent share
of stocks in the nancial portfolios of young investors (the portfolio specialization or
small saver puzzle).
This paper is motivated by the idea that if rare economic disasters can solve the
pricing puzzles they should also explain the observed quantities (household portfolio
holdings). Put di¤erently, perceived risk associated with a disaster in stock markets
should be revealed in household portfolios. This idea could be tested in two ways.
One would be to take historically calibrated values for the probability of disasters and
expected size (from, for example, Barro (2006)) and apply them to a life cycle model
with assumed preference parameter values to show how close one can get to observed
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life cycle proles. Instead, I choose to jointly estimate disaster expectations (both
probability and expected size) and preference parameters from observed portfolios
and then judge whether the estimates are plausible as compared to the historically
calibrated values. Moreover, I choose to use a much richer and realistic version of the
consumer problem than the original Mehra-Prescott model and the one assumed in
Reitz (1988) and Barro (2006). Estimating the entire structural model gives me the
opportunity to test several other explanations of equity premium against an expla-
nation based on economic disasters. If the correct quantities are not revealed in an
environment that is a lot more exible than the original one, the explanation of the
equity premium based on rare disasters would be signicantly weakened.
The results in this paper suggest that the expectations of rare disasters can go
some ways in explaining the portfolios of uneducated households only if it is reinforced
with an extreme (and rather implausible) labor market stress. Such expectations are
not revealed in the portfolios of more sophisticated and wealthy households that are
believed to be the relevant portion of the population in terms of aggregate wealth
and asset prices.
The structural estimation reported in this paper brings together three large sur-
veys conducted in the United States: the Survey of Consumer Finances (1983-2004)
that contains detailed wealth and portfolio allocation information; the Consumer
Expenditure Survey (1983-2004) that contains detailed durable and non durable ex-
penditure information; and nally, the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (1983-1994)
that allows me to calibrate group specic income process parameters. Limited het-
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erogeneity in all parameters is allowed for by estimating the structural parameters
separately for 4 groups (2 birth cohorts by 2 education levels). I also go signicantly
beyond the existing literature and allow for preference heterogeneity within groups.
Except for the old and more educated group, the probability of a rare disaster
and expected disaster size are estimated precisely. The point estimates for the per-
ceived disaster probability range from 1% (less educated young) to 5% (more educated
young). The estimated probability of a disaster is not statistically di¤erent from zero
for the old and more educated households (the wealthiest households in the sample).
Per-period participation costs (approximately 1% of the permanent income) and het-
erogeneity in the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion (value of 4 at the 25th percentile
and 9 at the 75th percentile) appear to be su¢ cient to explain the portfolios of these
households.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows: The next section presents the
structural model used in the estimation. Section 3 discusses the estimation method
and the auxiliary environment. Section 4 presents the data. Section 5 discusses the
results. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
I assume that the expected utility function is intertemporally additive over a nite
lifetime and the sub-utilities are iso-elastic. The problem of the generic consumer h
is
4
maxEt
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where C is non-durable consumption, h is the household specic coe¢ cient of rela-
tive risk aversion, h is the household specic rate of time preference. The coe¢ cient
of relative risk aversion and the rate of time preference are assumed to be distrib-
uted lognormally across households such that lnh  N(; ); lnh  N(; )
respectively1. The ideal would be to assume a joint distribution for the preference
parameters and estimate all ve distribution parameters (; ; ; ; ;). How-
ever, such an addition would increase the complexity of the problem, given the core
question, without o¤ering any useful insight. Here, I already go beyond what has
been done in the literature in terms of preference heterogeneity and assume parame-
ter heterogeneity one at a time. That is, when the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion
is assumed to be heterogenous, the discount rate heterogeneity is closed down, and
when discount rate heterogeneity is assumed, the heterogeneity in the coe¢ cient of
relative risk aversion is closed down. In the end, I let data determine which model
ts better2.
The end of life T is assumed to be certain. It would be straight forward to
incorporate stochastic mortality into the model but again, this addition is not likely
to signicantly a¤ect the results. Following Deaton (1991), I dene the endogenous
1The unboundedness of the discount rate and the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion will not
pose any di¢ culty in estimation because I use 6-point gaussian quadrature to approximate the
distributions which inevitably bounds possible ranges.
2Alan and Browning (2009) is the rst to estimate a joint distribution of the intertemporal
allocation parameters using food expenditure data in the PSID. The model of consumption in that
paper is much simpler than the model used here.
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state variable cash on hand as the sum of nancial assets and labour income and it
evolves as follows:
Xt+1 = (1 + r
e
t+1)St + (1 + r)Bt + Yt+1 (2)
where ret+1 is the stochastic return from the risky asset, r is the risk-free rate, St is
the amount of wealth invested in the risky asset, Bt is the amount of wealth invested
in the risk-free asset. Following Carroll and Samwick (1997), Yt+1 is stochastic labour
income which follows the following exogenous stochastic process:
Yt+1 = Pt+1Ut+1 (3)
Pt+1 = Gt+1PtNt+1 (4)
Permanent income, Pt; grows at the rate Gt+1 and it is subject to multiplicative
i.i.d shocks, Nt. Current income, Yt; is composed of a permanent component and a
transitory shock, Ut. I adopt the convention of estimating the earnings growth prole
by assuming Gt = f(t; Zt), where t represents age and Zt are observable variables
relevant for predicting earnings growth: I also assume that the transitory shocks,
Ut; are distributed independently and identically, take the value of zero with some
small but positive probability, and are otherwise lognormal: ln(Ut)  N( 0:52u ; 2u).
Similarly, permanent shocks Nt are i.i.d with ln(Nt)  N( 0:52n ; 2n): By assuming
that innovations to income are independent over time and across individuals I assume
away aggregate shocks to income. However, aggregate shocks are not completely
eliminated from the model since I assume the return process is common to all agents
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and, as explained below, I allow a link between market disasters and low income
realizations.
Introducing a risk of a zero income realization into the life cycle model is proposed
by Carroll (1992) and adopted by many subsequent papers3. It is important to note
that introducing a risk of a zero income realization into the standard model does
not by itself solve the problem of portfolio specialization or limited participation.
Although it generates diversied portfolios at the low end of the wealth distribution,
it also triggers prudence leading to rapid wealth accumulation early in the life cycle.
If the observed post-war equity premium were the expected return, some of this
wealth would be channeled into the stock market and the model would still predict
counterfactually high stock market participation and large risky asset shares at young
ages.
Returning to the model description, the excess return of the risky asset is assumed
to be i.i.d:
ret+1   r = + "t+1 (5)
where  is mean excess return and "t+1 is distributed normally with mean 0 and vari-
ance 2": Agents face a small but positive probability of a disastrous market downturn.
When such an event occurs, a large portion of the households stock market wealth
evaporates (return of   percent where  > 0). Moreover, when the asset market is
3Since income realizations of zero are rarely observed in the data, it may be more realistic to
assume that a labour market stress may be in the form of having to collect unemployment benets
for a given period. One of the models I test against the benchmark presented here assumes a oor
above zero for minimum income realizations.
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hit by a disaster, the probability of a zero income realization increases (from a small
calibrated value to  percent). It is important to note that in the case of such a dis-
aster, stock market participants lose  percent of their stock market wealth and face
a  percent chance of zero labor income for the whole year whereas nonparticipants
face only the job loss risk (  percent chance of zero labor income for the whole year).
I do not allow innovations to excess return to be correlated with innovations to per-
manent or transitory income in normal market times. Allowing for such a correlation
is straightforward and would reduce the ex-ante disaster probability and disaster size
needed to match the data. However, the empirical support for such a correlation is
very weak (see Heaton and Lucas (2000)), so I set it to zero.
One important assumption I make is that the risk-free rate is not a¤ected by a
disastrous market downturn. This may not be true as one may think that a disaster
in stock markets would push down government bond yields leading to a still higher
equity premium. Or, one may think of a war-like disaster where governments totally
or partially default. Incorporating a perceived probability of government default
can be done in the way Barro (2006) suggests. However, separately identifying such a
probability (assuming the size of the default is the same as the size of the stock market
decline as in Barro (2006)) from a stock market disaster probability is empirically
challenging. Given that there exists no clear pattern regarding how government bonds
will perform in disastrous times, I assume that the risk-free rate is not a¤ected by a
potential market disaster4.
4Barro (2006) shows that bills did quite well in the United States during the great depression
whereas partial default on government debt occured in Germany and Italy during WW II.
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The optimization problem involves solving the recursive Bellman equation via
backward induction. I divide the life cycle problem into two main sections: The
individual starts working life at the age of 25 and works until 60. He retires at 60 and
lives until 80. During his retirement he receives social security income each period
which is equal to a fraction  of his permanent income at the age of 60. The recursive
problem is:
Vt(Xt; Pt) = max
St;Bt

(Ct)
1 
1   +
1
1 + 
EtVt+1

(1 + ret+1)St + (1 + r)Bt + Yt+1; Pt+1

(6)
subject to borrowing and shortsale constraints
St  0; Bt  0
where Vt(:) denotes the value function.
The structure of the problem allows me to normalize the necessary variables by
dividing them by permanent income (see Carroll 1992). Doing this reduces the number
of endogenous state variables to one, namely the ratio of cash on hand to permanent
income. The Bellman equation after normalizing is:
Vt(xt) = max
st;bt

(ct)
1 
1   +
1
1 + 
Et(Gt+1Nt+1)
(1 )Vt+1

(1 + ret+1)st + (1 + r)bt=Gt+1Nt+1 + Ut+1

(7)
where xt = XtPt ; st =
St
Pt
; bt =
Bt
Pt
and ct = CtPt = xt   st   bt:
I assume away the bequest motive, therefore the consumption function cT and the
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value function V (cT ) in the nal period are cT = xT and V (xT ) =
x1 T
1  respectively:
In order to obtain the policy rules for earlier periods I dene a grid for the endogenous
state variable x and maximize the above equation for every point in the grid.
When the model is augmented with a per-period participation cost, the solution
requires some additional computations. Now, the optimizing agent has to decide
whether to participate in the stock market or not before he decides howmuch to invest.
This is done by comparing the discounted expected future value of participation and
that of nonparticipation in every period. This results in the following optimization
problems:
Vt(xt; It) = max
0;1
 
V 0(xt; It); V
1(xt; It)

(8)
where
V 0(xt; It) = max
st;bt

(ct)
1 
1   +
1
1 + 
EtVt+1 [xt+1; It+1]

(9)
subject to
xt+1 = (1 + r)bt=Gt+1Nt+1 + Ut+1 (10)
where It is a binary variable representing participation at time t. V 0(xt; It) is the value
the consumer gets by not participating regardless of whether he has participated in
the previous period or not, i.e. exit from the stock market is assumed to be costless5.
V 1(xt; It) = max
st;bt

(ct)
1 
1   +
1
1 + 
EtVt+1 [xt+1; It+1]

(11)
5It is plausible to assume that the agent incurs some transaction cost by exiting the stock market.
Considering di¤erent types of transaction costs associated with the stock market participation would
make estimation infeasible and it does not add any insight to the point made in the paper. See
Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) for a detailed treatment of stock market participation costs.
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subject to
xt+1 =

(1 + ret+1)st + (1 + r)bt

=Gt+1Nt+1 + Ut+1   F c (12)
V 1(xt; It) is the value the consumer gets by participating. F c is the xed per-period
cost to permanent income ratio which is 0 if the household does not have any stock
market investment and it is positive if he has some stock market investments. The
per-period cost considered here is not a one-time fee. It has to be paid (annually in
this framework) as long as the household holds some stock market wealth. It can
be thought of as the value of time spent to follow markets and price movements in
addition to actual trading fees. Since it is related to the opportunity cost of time it
is plausible to formulate it as a ratio to permanent income6.
In each time period, the household rst decides whether to invest in the stock
market or not (or stay in it if he is already in) by comparing the expected discounted
value of each choice. Then, conditional on participation he decides how much wealth
to allocate to the risky asset. If he chooses not to participate, the only saving in-
strument is the risk-free asset which has a constant return r. Further details of the
solution method are given in Appendix A.
6This assumption is fairly standard in the literature. With this simplifying but justiable as-
sumption, I reduce the total number of state variables to two: age (exogenous) and cash-on-hand
(endogenous).
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3 Estimation Overview
3.1 Simulating Auxiliary Statistics
The structural estimation is performed for four di¤erent groups (birth year-education
cohorts). Households are rst grouped according to their broad educational attain-
ment. Households with heads who have less than a college degree are labelled as "less
educated", those who have a college degree or higher are labeled as "more educated".
Within these groups, households are further divided according to their birth year co-
horts. Households with heads who were born before 1946 are labelled as "old", after
1946 are labelled as "young". The details of the sample selection will be given in the
next section. The estimation procedure is an application of Simulated Minimum Dis-
tance (SMD) which involves matching statistics from the data and from a simulated
model.7 For the bench mark estimation, I allow the discount rate, , or the coe¢ cient
of relative risk aversion, ;to be heterogenous across groups and lognormally distrib-
uted within a group. When the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion is assumed to be
homogenous, it is still allowed to di¤er across the four groups. Similarly, when the
discount rate is assumed to be homogenous, it is still allowed to di¤er across the four
groups.
The simulation procedure takes a vector of structural parameters
7A description of the general SMD procedure is given in Appendix B.
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	 = f; (2); ; (2); p; ; ; g where
 


mean log-coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion
(2) variance of log-coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion, (set to zero if 
2
 > 0)
() mean log-discount rate
(2) variance of log-discount rate, (set to zero if 
2
 > 0)
(p) probability of disaster
() size of expected loss in case of disaster
() probability of zero income in case of disaster
() per-period stock market participation cost
and solves the underlying dynamic program described in the previous section. The
resulting age and discount rate (or coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion) dependent
policy functions are used to simulate consumption, portfolio share and participation
paths for H households for t = 1; :::T . To perform simulations, I need two T by H
matrices (for permanent and transitory income shocks), and two H by 1 vectors (for
initial wealth to income ratio and discount rates, or coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion)
of standard normal variables8 in addition to actual realized stock returns from 1983
to 2004.
As discussed in the data section, the lack of panel data on consumption, wealth
8If lnx  N(a; b), we can simulate draws from a lognormal by taking x  exp(a+bN(0; 1)) where
N(0; 1) denotes the standard Normal. The mean and variance of x are given by x = exp(a)
p
exp(b2)
, 2x = exp(2a) exp(b
2)(exp(b2)  1)
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and income forces me to use some complementary data techniques. This means
having to replicate the limitations of the actual data in the simulated data to obtain
consistent estimates. To do this, the procedure rst simulates the balanced panel of
consumption, portfolio shares and participation for all households and then selects
observations to replicate the structure of the cross section data. For example, suppose
we have 234 25-year-olds and 567 26-year-olds in the youngest cohort in the SCF. The
procedure will pick 234 25 year old households from the simulated paths, then will
pick 567 26 year olds (di¤erent households as we are creating a cross section to imitate
the data) and so on. In the end this simulated data is used to calculate all wealth
related auxiliary parameters (described below).
For consumption, the process is more involved. As described below, natural aux-
iliary parameters to describe consumption behavior are the mean and variance of
consumption growth. Since the construction of these auxiliary parameters requires
observing households for at least two periods and CEX is repeated cross section9, I use
the quasi-panel methods developed by Browning, Deaton and Irish (1985) and used
by many other researchers. This method amounts to taking the cross section averages
of consumption within a given cohort (controlling for some time-invariant household
characteristics) and then generating consumption growth using these means.
9The CEX has a rotating quarterly panel dimension that I do not use here. This is explained in
the data section.
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3.2 Choosing an Auxiliary Environment
I now need to choose statistics of the data - so called auxiliary parameters (aps) - that
are matched in the SMD step; I denote these 1; ::K . As always, we have a trade-
o¤ between the closeness of the aps to structural parameters (the diagonalityof the
binding function, see Gouriéroux et al (1993) and Hall and Rust (1999)) and the need
to be able to calculate the aps quickly. Many of the aps dened below are closely
related to the underlying structure but none of the aps are consistent estimators
of any parameter of interest; rather, they are chosen to give a good, parsimonious
description of the joint distribution of consumption, nancial wealth and stock market
returns across cohorts.
The rst ap relates to the total nancial wealth: it is the median nancial wealth
to permanent income ratio. This will help me identify the discount rate.
01 = median (finw) (13)
The next six aps (02 07) are smoothed age proles of participation and portfolio
shares. I summarize age proles with a quadratic polynomial, i.e., I rst run the
following two regressions:
share = 02 + 03Age+ 04Age
2 + " (14)
part = 05 + 06Age+ 07Age
2 +  (15)
15
where part is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the household owns stocks and zero
otherwise. Share is the portfolio share of stocks in the households nancial portfolio.
The next two aps are the mean and standard deviation of the portfolio share of stocks
conditional on participation. As will subsequently become clear, these aps play an
important role, in conjunction with consumption aps, in pinning down the coe¢ cient
of relative risk aversion parameter and the perceived disaster probability.
08 = mean(sharejpart = 1) (16)
09 = std(sharejpart = 1) (17)
The next two aps relate to consumption; they are the mean and standard deviation
of consumption growth. The e¤ect of family size changes (size) on consumption
growth is removed via an initial regression:
 logC = 0 + 1size+  (18)
Then,
10 = 0 (19)
11 = std() (20)
the last two aps are the unconditional mean of portfolio share of stocks and partici-
pation rate respectively:
12 = mean(share) (21)
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13 = mean(part) (22)
While the median nancial wealth to permanent income ratio and mean consumption
growth rate help to identify the mean discount rate, the variation in consumption
growth helps to identify the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (the reciprocal
of the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion). Thus, I have 13 aps to estimate 7 struc-
tural parameters, leaving me with 6 degrees of freedom. In principle, one can have
many more aps (second, third and forth moments, covariances etc.) but I believe
that the auxiliary environment described above is a su¢ ciently rich and intuitive
characterization of the joint distribution of parameters of interest.
It is important to emphasize that separately identifying the probability and size
of the disastrous event is di¢ cult in this setting. Simply put, there may be many
combinations of these two parameters leading to the same auxiliary environment.
However, repeated re-estimations with a large set of di¤erent starting values converged
to the same estimates suggesting that the model is at least locally identied within
the restricted parameter space. These restrictions include lower and upper bounds for
the preference parameters (naturally imposed by the discretization process), positivity
constraints for variances and probabilities and negativity constraint for the disaster
size.
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4 Data
4.1 Pseudo-Panel Construction
I work with two distinct repeated cross-sectional data sets to obtain the aps. One of
them contains data on consumption and the other contains data on nancial wealth.
Using these data, I create a pseudo-panel following Browning, Deaton and Irish
(1985). This technique involves dening cells based on birth cohorts, and other time
invariant or perfectly predictable characteristics (typically education, sex and race),
and then following the cell mean of any given variable of interest over time.
I use the American Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) for consumption ex-
penditure information. The data covers the period between 1983 and 2004. The
expenditure information is recorded quarterly with approximately 5000 households
in each wave. Every household is interviewed ve times, four of which are recorded
(the rst interview is practice). Although the attrition is substantial (about 30% at
the end of the fourth quarter), the survey is considered to be a representative sample
of the US population. I select married households whose head identied himself as
white. Households that do not report nondurable consumption for all four quarters
are excluded as I use annual nondurable consumption expenditure to generate my
consumption aps. My nondurable consumption measure excludes medicare and edu-
cation expenditures and all durable expenditures. Annual nondurable consumption
for each household is obtained by aggregating over four quarters.
After generating the real annual consumption measure for each household, I create
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a pseudo-panel for nondurable consumption. As described earlier, rst, I divide the
sample into two broad groups by level of education: college and higher (referred to as
more educated) and less than college (referred to as less educated). Then I dene 2
birth cohorts for each education group, giving four groups in total. I restrict the age
range to be 25 to 59. The reason, as explained in the results section, is that it becomes
increasingly di¢ cult to model portfolio holdings as households approach retirement
age. I calculate the mean of the logarithm of real annual consumption for each group
for each year I have data10. The mean and standard deviation of consumption growth
over time (after removing family size e¤ect) constitute my consumption aps.
For asset information I use the American Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF)
which covers the same time period as the CEX. The information on nancial wealth
and portfolio allocation is recorded at the household level and it is available through
the family les. The SCF contains the most comprehensive wealth data available
among industrialized countries. It is a cross section that is repeated every three years.
Note that CEX provides annual expenditure information whereas wealth information
is available triennially in the SCF. This limitation is also replicated in the simulated
data. It is important to note that wealth aps are generated using SCF weights as
SCF oversamples wealthy households. Finally, imputations in the SCF are taken into
account when boostrapping the variance covariance matrix of the aps.
I restrict the sample from the SCF in the same way that I restricted the CEX, and
10The fact that one can control the order of aggregation is one of the great advantages of the
pseudo-panel technique. Since I have to generate a consumption growth measure later on, I rst
take logs of household consumption and then calculate the mean. Related studies using aggregate
data lack this luxury (as the sum of logs does not equal the log of sums).
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dene the same groups. Variables of interest from this data source are the share of
stocks in householdsnancial portfolios (portfolio share), stock market participation
indicator, portfolio shares conditional on participation and nancial wealth to per-
manent income ratio11. A households nancial portfolio is dened as the sum of all
bonds, stocks, certicate of deposits and mutual funds. Assets such as trust accounts
and annuities are excluded as they are not incorporated in my life cycle model. I also
exclude checking and saving accounts as they are kept mostly for householdstrans-
actional needs, and my model abstracts from liquidity issues. Risky assets are dened
as all publicly and privately traded stocks as well as all-stock mutual funds. Bonds,
money market funds, certicate of deposits and bond funds altogether constitute the
risk-free asset.
4.2 Initial Conditions and Other Parameters
Following standard practice in the literature, I restrict the number of structural para-
meters that I estimate and calibrate the others. In principle, all the parameters could
be estimated through the structural routine, including the income process parame-
ters. However, this extra complication does not add any insight to the point made
in the paper as the real issue is to estimate the perceived disaster parameters that
justify observed household portfolios. I use the Panel Studies of Income Dynamics
(PSID) to calibrate the parameters of income processes (1983-1992). The variances of
11Permanent income for each household is the predicted values obtained from the regression of
labor income on age, occupation and industry dummies. This estimation (although imperfect) is
quite standard in the literature.
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innovations to permanent income and transitory income are estimated separately for
all 4 groups. Earnings growth proles are estimated separately for the two education
levels and taken as common for both cohorts within an education level.
Table 1 presents the estimates. It has been argued that the ex-post variation in
individual income may not accurately represent the true uncertainty that the individ-
ual is facing. In particular, households may have several informal ways to mitigate
idiosyncratic background risk that an econometrician cannot observe. If this is the
case, we tend to overestimate actual income variances. Bound and Krueger (1991)
and Bound (1994) suggest that roughly a third of estimated variance is due to mis-
measurement. Therefore I use two thirds of the estimated value of the permanent
income variance and use the actual estimated value for the transitory income variance.
I set the risk-free rate to 2%, the mean equity return is taken to be 6% with a
standard deviation of 20% (these values seem to be the consensus, see Mehra (2008)):
I set the probability of a zero income realization to 0:00302 (as estimated by Carroll
(1992)).
Since I do not observe all households at the beginning of their life cycle, i.e. at
age 25, I need to estimate an initial wealth distribution to initiate simulations. One
approach is to assume that initial assets to permanent income ratios are drawn from
a log normal distribution and estimate the mean and standard deviation using all
25-year-olds in the data (see Gourinchas and Parker (2002) and Alan (2006)). The
immediate objection to this approach is that it is unrealistic to think that older cohorts
started out with the same level of initial wealth as younger cohorts. Unfortunately,
21
we cannot possibly know the level of wealth the older cohorts had when they were
young.
To overcome this problem, I devise a novel way of initializing the simulations.
For each household I observe, I start the simulations using its observed wealth to
permanent income ratio. For example, say I need to simulate life cycle paths of a
household whom I observe at the age of 40 in year 1998, with wealth to permanent
income ratio of 2.5. I start the simulations of this household by assuming that initial
wealth to permanent income ratio is 2.5, using the policy functions that are relevant
for 40 year-olds and actual stock market returns starting in 1998. This households
paths are simulated until he is 59. This way, I exactly replicate the age structure
of the SCF, including the major shortcomings of the data (missing values, triennial
structure and absence of a panel).
5 Estimation Results
The benchmark models I estimate have seven structural parameters:
	 = f; (2); ; (2); p; ; ; g
Parameters are estimated for four groups separately assuming discount rate and co-
e¢ cient of relative risk aversion heterogeneity one at a time (referred to as  hetero-
geneity and  heterogeneity respectively from here on). For all groups,  heterogeneity
yielded the lowest chi-squared criterion. Therefore, all further analyses in this sec-
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tion are based on models with  heterogeneity (benchmark) and I will not discuss 
heterogeneity.12.
5.1 Goodness of Fit
Before turning to the parameter estimates, I illustrate the general features of the t.
To do this, I estimate a number of restricted variants of the benchmark model. Table
2 presents my goodness of t results. The rst model is the unrestricted model with
seven structural parameters and  heterogeneity (Model 1, benchmark). The overall
t is quite reasonable even though the model is rejected for all four groups based
on the chi-squared criterion. One perhaps not very surprising result is that the t
is better for the less educated group. The likely reason for a better t for the less
educated is that nancial wealth is more homogenous (as well as low) and much less
skewed for this group. It is on the other hand, too skewed and heterogenous for the
more educated to be captured by this model. The particular e¤ect of  heterogeneity
can be seen by examining the second row of the same table where  heterogeneity is
closed down. Increases in chi-square statistics are sizable enough to warrant rejection
of  homogeneity for all groups. However, the jumps in the chi-square values are
much larger for the educated group (from 705 to 1384 for the young, from 100 to
545 for the old) suggesting a higher degree of preference heterogeneity amongst this
group.
12Overall t and parameter estimates for  heterogeneity are not very di¤erent from those with
 heterogeneity; see the last row of Table 3 for the over all t. Homogeneity of discount rates are
rejected by all groups. Full results for  heterogeneity are available upon request.
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The next alternative model I consider replaces the possibility of a zero income
realization with the possibility of realizing a strictly positive income oor. This
assumption is perhaps more realistic for the more educated households. For example,
an individual may lose his job and settle for a small fraction of his current income for
a year (collecting unemployment benet for example). I assume that in normal times
this probability is 4% (roughly the natural rate of unemployment in the U.S.) and
the fraction is 30%. As in the benchmark case, I let the probability of such situation
arising during the disaster be a free parameter to estimate. I estimate this model by
closing down preference heterogeneity so the fair comparison would be against model
2 where  heterogeneity is closed down. Note also that this model is not nested in
the benchmark model and should be viewed as an alternative instead of a restricted
variant. As can be seen in the third row of the table, the t for this model is much
better for the educated group; chi-square values go down from 1384 to 969 and from
545 to 488 for the young and the old respectively. This suggests that the risk of a
zero income realization is not a good assumption for these households. The opposite
is observed for the less educated; large jumps in chi square values from 59.5 to 1923
and from 30.8 to 393 for the young and the old respectively.
The possibility of a disaster does not seem to be a good assumption for older
and more educated households as suggested by the statistics in the fourth row of
the Table 2. This variant of the model is estimated by closing down the disaster
possibility while keeping  heterogeneity13. In fact, for these households, even the
13The chi-square increment between the benchmark and model 4 is 23 = 104:9   100:2 = 4:7.
Given the critical value for 23 is 7.81 at 95%, model 4 restrictions are not rejected.
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simplest model with no heterogeneity, no disaster expectations and no entry cost do
not lead to a huge jump in the chi-squared criterion (model 5, 211 = 702:7) while
such a variant makes the t hopeless for all other groups; see the last row. The take
away from this table is that the standard model has serious di¢ culties to explain
household portfolios and this di¢ culty cannot be overcome by assuming expectations
of a market disaster. Although this explanation seems to go some ways to explain
the behavior of the households with very little nancial wealth, one should keep in
mind that these are not the individuals who are relevant for prices.
An economically meaningful way to see where the t fails is to look at the t-ratios
for the di¤erence between data aps and their simulated counterparts calculated at
estimated structural parameters. This is shown in Table 3 for the less educated and
Table 4 for the more educated. For the less educated, only a couple of the t-ratios
point to rejection, whereas for the more educated most of the simulated aps do not
come close to their data counterpart. The biggest failure comes from the rst ap (1),
the median nancial wealth to permanent income ratio. As can be seen in the rst
row of Table 4 the model persistently generates higher aps than the data.
How do the simulated life-cycle proles of portfolio holdings look compared to the
data? Figures 1 and 2 depict life cycle stock market participation and portfolio share
proles calculated at the estimated structural parameters (see Table 5) superimposed
on their data counterparts. Proles obtained from restricted models (see Table 2) are
also superimposed for a more general comparison. As can be seen from these gures,
simulated participation and portfolio share paths from the unrestricted model (Model
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1) closely track their data counterparts for the less educated groups and shutting
down  heterogeneity does not visibly worsens the t; see Figure 1. Note also that
the standard model (Model 5) is absolutely hopeless. The life cycle proles do not
seem to track their data counterpart as closely for the more educated group, consistent
with estimation results; see Figure 2. What is particularly disturbing in this gure is
that the model persistently generate a hump shape for shares and participation which
does not exist in the data.
Figure 3 tell us exactly where each model fails. It depicts simulated age proles of
conditional portfolio shares (at the estimated parameter values) and their data coun-
terparts. The rst and most important thing to note is that the degree of small saver
puzzle diminishes especially for the less educated when we allow for the possibility of
disasters. Model 1 and 2 deliver lower portfolio shares in earlier life, and so is much
more congruent with the data. This is obviously not the case for the more educated.
It should be noted that the main reason for the decisive rejection of the model for
the more educated (large chi-square criterions) is the fact that conditional shares are
low and very precisely estimated in the data. Such low conditional shares are hard
to match given the nancial wealth of this group.
5.2 Disaster Expectations
I now turn to the structural estimates based on the benchmark model. Table 5
presents the estimates for all four groups14. Except for the old and more educated
14Although the asymptotic standard errors are unreliable for these types of models, I still report
them. The precision can be judged in an economically more meaningful way by considering the
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group, the probability of a disaster and the expected size of the disaster are esti-
mated precisely. The point estimates for the perceived disaster probability range
from 1% (less educated young) to 5% (more educated young). For the less educated,
the expected size estimates are very large (80% and 70% for the young and the old
respectively). The probability of a zero income realization in the case of a disaster
is implausibly high for the less educated young (38%). It is not as large for the less
educated old (16%). The estimated probability of a disaster is not statistically di¤er-
ent from zero for the old and more educated. Consistent with the earlier discussion
on goodness of t, the more educated older cohort (the wealthiest households in the
sample) do not appear to expect such disasters. The very fact that it is these house-
holds that drive aggregate wealth casts serious doubt on an explanation of the equity
premium based rare disasters.
How do my estimates compare with Barros calibrated values? The real stock
market return was -16.5% per year between the years 1929 and 1932 in the United
States, implying over a 50 percent decline in the stock market wealth in four years.
Since disasters are assumed to strike in an iid fashion (as in Reitz and Barro), the
size estimates are not directly comparable but can be interpreted as total expected
wealth loss in the event of a disaster. On the other hand, I can directly compare my
estimated disaster probabilities with Barros calibrated values. An estimate of 80%
loss seems to be too big especially since it is coupled with 38% probability of zero
income realization for the less educated young. For this group, the estimated disaster
proximity of the aps generated from the data and from the simulated data at the estimated values;
see Table 3 and Table 4.
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probability is about 1%. For the old and less educated, this parameter is estimated
to be around 2 %. These estimates are perfectly in line with Barros calibrated values
(1.5 to 2 percent). However, for the more educated young, although the expected
size estimate seems reasonable (41%), the estimated disaster probability is around
5% which is too high compared to the calibrated values in Barro (2006) and Barro
and Ursua (2008).
5.3 Other Findings
A striking result of the estimation is that there is a substantial variation in preference
parameter estimates across education groups but not so much across birth cohorts
within education groups. Consistent with Alan and Browning (2009), the less edu-
cated seem to have a lower relative risk aversion. Discount rate estimates seem very
high especially for the older cohorts (28% for the old and more educated). The coe¢ -
cient of relative risk aversion estimates are in line with estimates based on micro data
on consumption (see Attanasio et al (1999), Gourinchas and Parker (2002)) especially
for the less educated. In general, estimates based on consumption data generate a
lower coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion compared to estimates based on wealth data
(see Cagetti (2003)). Overall, consumption based estimates of the coe¢ cient of rel-
ative risk aversion range between unity and 3. The range I estimate is much wider;
the median coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion for the oldest less educated cohort is
estimated to be 1:36 (my lowest estimate), and that for the oldest more educated
cohort is estimated to be 6:1 (my highest estimate). In terms of heterogeneity within
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cohort-education cells the more educated group is the most heterogenous (consistent
with the goodness of t tests). Not surprisingly, the old and more educated group is
the most heterogenous with the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion of 4 and 9 at the
25th and 75th percentiles. The same estimates for the young and more educated are
2:9 and 3:615.
Another interesting result in this paper is that participation cost estimates are
zero for the less educated but positive and signicant for the more educated. There
is now a sizeable body of research promoting transaction cost based explanations of
the portfolio and equity premium puzzles (see for example Alan (2006) and other ref-
erences therein). The idea is that households face costs associated with participating
and trading in the stock market. The denition of these costs is usually very broad;
it incorporates a range of things from simple trading fees to the opportunity cost of
time spent on portfolio management. While such transaction costs go some way to
reconcile observed patterns of stock market participation, they are not su¢ cient to
explain other observed portfolio features, particularly shares conditional on partici-
pation. When I reformulate the risk associated with investing in the stock market
by allowing for the possibility of a disaster (a¤ecting labor earnings as well as stock
market wealth), participation, portfolio shares and shares conditional on participation
come down to reasonable levels making the participation cost assumption unneces-
sary for the less educated. But these costs seem to be still important for the more
15Table 5 reports the mean log coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion and its standard deviation. The
median values and percentiles that I am reporting here come from the simulation of the relevant
log-normal distribution (at the estimated parameters) for 100,000 households for each group.
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educated, especially for the older cohort where the per-period participation cost is
estimated to be approximately 1 percent of the permanent income.
Overall, the results suggest that allowing for rare disasters does lead the life cycle
portfolio choice model to t the household portfolio data well for some households
albeit not the ones that are driving the aggregate wealth. Preference heterogeneity
and participation costs appear to be better explanations for the portfolio decisions of
wealthier households. If we are to accept the explanation of equity premium based
on economic disasters, we should, at the very least, be able to infer the expectation
of such disasters from the quantities held by the wealthy households. The message
from the data is mixed at best.
6 Conclusion
This paper evaluates the argument that rare economic disasters, once taken into ac-
count, can solve asset pricing puzzles. It is natural to assess whether correct quantities
can be obtained from a framework that claims to yield correct prices. I show that it
is di¢ cult to reconcile actual quantities in the micro data with this explanation. If
return expectations include a small probability of a disastrous market event, observed
household portfolio holdings and consumption growth can be reconciled with the stan-
dard intertemporal model only for households that posses very little wealth. Even for
these households such reconciliation is not possible without assuming a serious labor
market stress at the time of the stock market disaster. Portfolio decisions of wealthier
households can be better explained by a combination of preference heterogeneity and
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transaction costs.
I do not test the disaster explanation directly against explanations based on pref-
erence re-specications. Such explanations include the internal and external habit
models proposed by Constantinides (1990), Campbell and Cochrane (1999) and Abel
(1990). The common feature of these preference re-specications is that they in-
crease e¤ective risk aversion. In terms of the implied life cycle paths of portfolios,
such models behave similarly to models with extreme uninsurable income risk. In
both cases, the marginal utility of consumption can become extremely high (near
zero consumption, the subsistence level, or the habit level.) The limitation of all of
these explanations is that when the e¤ective risk aversion is high, so is prudence. This
implies counterfactually high nancial wealth accumulation and consequently coun-
terfactually high stock market participation over the life cycle. Even though one can
match overall mean conditional and unconditional portfolio shares with such models,
the implied life cycle proles will not look anything like their data counterparts in
other dimensions. Explanations based on business cycle risk (a way of correlating
stock returns with labor earnings indirectly) may be a more promising route as in
Lynch and Tan (2009). However, the need to reconcile other aspects of intertempo-
ral behavior such as consumption and savings within the same framework remains
crucial.
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A Solution and Simulation Methods
The standard life cycle model for portfolio choice described in Section 2 is solved
via backward induction by imposing a terminal wealth condition. Simply, in the
last period of life all accumulated wealth has to be consumed so the policy rule for
consumption is
cT = xT
and for stocks and bonds
sT = 0; bT = 0
Therefore the last periods value function is the indirect utility function:
VT (xT ) =
x1 T
1  
In order to solve for the policy rules at T   1; I discretize the state variable cash on
hand to permanent income ratio x. The algorithm rst nds the investment in the
risky and risk-free assets that maximizes the value function for each value in the grid
of x: Then, another optimization is performed where the generic consumer has only
the risk-free asset to invest in. Values of both optimizations are compared and the
rule that results in a higher value is picked. The value function at T   1 is the outer
envelope of the two value functions. Since I use a smooth cubic spline to approximate
value functions, nonconvexities due to taking the outer envelope of two functions do
not pose any numerical di¢ culty.
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B Simulated Minimum Distance
Here I present a short account of the Simulated Minimum Distance (SMD) method
as applied generally to panel data (see Hall and Rust (2002) and Browning, Ejrnæs
and Alvarez (2006) for details). Suppose that we observe h = 1; 2::H units over
t = 1; 2:::T periods recording the values on a set of Y variables that we wish to model
and a set of X variables that are to be taken as conditioning variables. Thus we
record f(Y1; X1); :::(YH ; XH)g where Yh is a T  l matrix and Xh is a T  k matrix.
For modelling we assume that Y given X is identically and independently distrib-
uted over units with the parametric conditional distribution F (YhjXh; ) ; where 
is an m-vector of parameters. If this distribution is tractable enough we could de-
rive a likelihood function and use either maximum likelihood estimation or simulated
maximum likelihood estimation. Alternatively, we might derive some moment impli-
cations of this distribution for observables and use GMM to recover estimates of a
subset of the parameter vector. Sometimes, however, deriving the likelihood func-
tion is extremely onerous; in that case, we can use SMD if we can simulate Yh given
the observed Xh and parameters for the model. To do this, we rst choose an in-
teger S for the number of replications and then generate S H simulated outcomes
(Y 11 ; X1); :::(Y
1
H ; XH); (Y
2
1 ; X1); :::(Y
S
H ; XH)
	
; these outcomes, of course, depend on
the model chosen (F (:)) and the value  takes in the model.
Thus we have some data on H units and some simulated data on S H units that
have the same form. The obvious procedure is to choose a value for the parameters
which minimizes the distance between some features of the real data and the same
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features of the simulated data. To do this, dene a set of auxiliary parameters that
are used for matching. In the Gouriéroux et al. (1993) Indirect Inference procedure,
the auxiliary parameters are maximizers of a given data dependent criterion which
constitutes an approximation to the true data generating process. In Hall and Rust
(2002), the auxiliary parameters are simply statistics that describe important aspects
of the data. I follow this approach. Thus I rst dene a set of J auxiliary parameters:
Dj =
1
H
HX
h=1
gj (Yh; Xh) ; j = 1; 2:::J (23)
where J  m so that I have at least as many auxiliary parameters as model parame-
ters. The J-vector of auxiliary parameters derived from the data is denoted by D.
Using the same functions gj (:) I can also calculate the corresponding values for the
simulated data:
Sj =
1
S H
SX
s=1
HX
h=1
gj (Y sh ; Xh) ; j = 1; 2:::J (24)
and denote the corresponding vector by S (). Identication follows if the Jacobian
of the mapping from model parameters to auxiliary parameters has full rank:
rank
 rS () = m with probability 1 (25)
This e¤ectively requires that the model parameters be relevant for the auxiliary
parameters.
Given sample and simulated auxiliary parameters, I take a J  J positive denite
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matrix W and dene the SMD estimator as:
^SMD = argmin

 
S ()  D0W  S ()  D (26)
The choice I adopt is the (bootstrapped) covariance matrix of D. Typically we have
J > m; in this case the choice of weighting matrix gives a criterion value that is
distributed as a 2 (J  m) under the null that we have the correct model.
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Estimated std of Estimated std of
permanent shocks transitory shocks
Young :12 :12
Less Educated (:01) (:01)
Old :15 :13
(:01) (:01)
Young :11 :10
More Educated (:01) (:004)
Old :12 :10
(:01) (:01)
Standard errors in parentheses. Mean predictable income growth for the more
and less educated are 0:018 and  0:001 respectively. Source PSID 1983-1992
Table 1: Estimated Parameters of Income Processes
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Less Educated
Auxiliary Young Old
Parameters Data Simulated Data Simulated
01 :08 :08 :10 :10
(:48) (:17)
02 :06 :06  :45  :27
(:01) (:16)
03  :002  :002 :02 :009
(:01) (:23)
04 :000 :000  :00  :000
(:10) (:35)
05 :015 :19  1:15 :968
(:53) (:93)
06 :019  :008 :05  :05
(:54) (1:1)
07 :000 :000  :00 :00
(:51) (1:2)
08 :47 :45 :46 :43
(:90) (:82)
09 :30 :27 :32 :30
(2:7) (1:7)
10  :01 :001  :001 :02
(1:3) (:23)
11 :05 :05 :05 :02
(:25) (2:9)
12 :10 :10 :12 :12
(:26) (:16)
13 :21 :19 :27 :24
(:64) (:61)
Table 3: Auxiliary Parameters and Simulated Counterparts, Less Educated
Absolute t-ratios in parantheses.
*: signicant at 5%
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More Educated
Auxiliary Young Old
Parameters Data Simulated Data Simulated
01 :28 :55 :64 :98
(13) (3:7)
02  :18  1:76  :50  2:21
(9:4) (1:2)
03 :01 :09 :02 :09
(9:1) (1:2)
04  :00  :001  :00  :001
(8:8) (1:3)
05  :45  2:32  :86  3:09
(7:3) (:80)
06 :03 :12 :05 :13
(6:8) (:71)
07  0:00  :00  :00  :001
(7:1) (:61)
08 :53 :64 :52 :63
(11) (7:8)
09 :30 :25 :31 :30
(11) (1:6)
10 :007 :009 :01 :02
(:35) (1:7)
11 :039 :014 :06 :09
(2:2) (1:4)
12 :29 :24 :33 :39
(4:9) (2:3)
13 :54 :38 :63 :60
(11) (:74)
Table 4: Auxiliary Parameters and Simulated Counterparts, Less Educated
Absolute t-ratios in parantheses.
*: signicant at 5%
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Less Educated More Educated
Young Old Young Old
Mean of Log Coe¢ cient of Relative Risk Aversion() :42
 :31 1:17 1:80
(:12) (:20) (:11) (:06)
Std of Log Coe¢ cient of Relative Risk Aversion() :020 :009 :167 :601
(:07) (:10) (:09) (:18)
Discount Rate() :17 :19 :06 :28
(:06) (:04) (:02) (:08)
Probability of Disaster (p) :007 :024 :051 :0004
(:001) (:008) (:002) (:014)
Size of disaster () :81 :70 :41 :0001
(:11) (:13) (:03) (:013)
Probability of zero income increase of disaster () :38 :16 :004 :0004
(:056) (:04) (:005) (:06)
Per-period participation cost () :00 :00 :004 :007
(:00) (:01) (:001) (:003)
26 for  heterogeneity 38:6
 24:7 705:0 100:2
26 for  heterogeneity 44:3 25:8 1008 468:5
Table 5: Structural Estimates
Asymptotic standard errors in parantheses.
**: preferred model
*: signicant at 5%.
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